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Physics as a Way of Thinking*
ALPHEUS W SMITHt
There is always before us one supreme question. From
what angle may we view the physical and social world so that
it may be reasonably intelligible, so that we may feel a friendly
relation to it and accept it as our home. The Buddhist finds
his answer in a toleration for what he may neither understand
nor alter. The Greeks like others under similar conditions
asked this question and replied with a lucidity peculiar to them-
selves, "It is something like myself." In such an answer there
is no attempt to rise above immediate human needs and satis-
factions and to find universal relations which are independent
of time and space. The physical scientist on the other hand
must thrust aside all personal and social implications of the
physical world and address himself to finding order and system
among physical phenomena. Here it is proposed to look at
some of the more essential characteristics of physical thinking,
to trace the way in which they have developed and to suggest
how this way of thinking may have validity in other fields of
thought. Approached in this way, physics is considered not as
a framework which determines our material environment but
as a type of thinking which penetrates our intellectual atmos-
phere - not as a record of achievements and tendencies but as
an indication of essential characteristics of the human mind in
its attempt to build around itself an ordered and organized
universe which will be an agreeable intellectual habitation.
To get an impression of primitive man's approach to the
physical universe one can scarcely do better than to quote from
G. Lowes Dickinson. "When we try to conceive of the state of
mind of primitive man, the first thing that occurs to us is the
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bewilderment and terror he must have felt in the presence of
the powers of nature. Naked, homeless, weaponless, he is at
the mercy, every hour, of this immense and incalculable Some-
thing, so alien and hostile to himself. As fire it burns, as water
it drowns, as tempest it hurries and destroys; benignant it may
be at times, in warm sunshine and calm but the kindness is brief
and treacherous. Anyhow, whatever its mood, it has to be met
and dealt with. By its help or in the teeth of its resistance,
each step in advance must be won. every hour, every minute
it is there to be reckoned with." Here we have the background
of an animistic interpretation of nature. This was the first and
simplest way man found to make himself at home in the
physical world. To do it he called forth all that was alien in
the world and clothed it in human form, converted all the
mysterious powers of nature into beings like himself only more
powerful and thus ended by making the world of nature an
expression or an enlargement of himself. Thus conceived, the
physical world became familiar and somewhat comprehensible.
Starting with this picture we may trace the history of physical
science as the history of the human mind adjusting itself by an
infinite series of steps to the physical world, assimilating here
a bit and there a bit of material and ever trying to escape the
apparent chaos which surrounds it.
The animistic period represented by the attitude of the early
Greeks was followed by a long period ending about 1550 A. D.
in which there was comparatively little advance in our knowl-
edge of the physical universe. In this period domnated by
Greek philosophy, the interpretation of nature was an achieve-
ment of pure thought unsupported by observation and experi-
ment. Man was the center of the frame of reference to which
all physical phenomena were referred. Since he seemed always
to be actuated by purposes, it was assumed that the universe
must also be for a purpose. Everything existed for man's pur-
pose. The sun to give him light and heat; the rain to insure
him food and proper living conditions; the plants and animals
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for his comfort or pleasure. In brief, the physical world was a
setting for man's destiny. Referred to this frame of reference
the interpretation of physical phenomena became an unverified
achievement of the human mind. This egocentric and teleo-
logical point of view was very satisfying and persistent. It
made man the center of the universe, the measure of its mean-
ing and the observation post from which all events must be
viewed. The tenacity with which man clung to this point of
view is evident from the bitterness of the controversy which
arose when Copernicus proposed to use the sun instead of the
earth as the center of the solar system. At that time it seemed
to man that if he, himself, were not really the center of the
universe, then at least this planet on which he finds himself
must be the most significant spot in an unexplored universe
and must be used as the center from which all observations are
made and all results are evaluated. Now nothing of this point
of view is left in modern physics. To a greater or less degree
it persists in the biological and social sciences. But just as
physics had to free itself from a teleological point of view so
also must these other sciences free themselves from modes of
thought or types of reasoning which involve emotion, design,
or purpose.
A second error in the Greek metaphysical approach to na-
ture arose from the fact it assumed perfection for the universe
and on the basis of inadequate observations tried to force nature
to fit into this hypothesis. Objectionable facts were over-
looked and principles supported when observations were con-
trary to them. Such an hypothesis of congealed and crystallized
perfection removes the universe from all change and allows us
to proceed as if we were dealing with a fixed and unchangeable
group of physical phenomena for which a final interpretation
is once and for all time possible. Such an approach, even when
supplemented by controlled experiments and observations in-
troduces the concept of an absolute and fixed mode of thought
in which it is assumed that man can penetrate the world of
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sense-perceptions and reach a world of reality which has some
kind of existence independent of himself - a real and absolute
world to which we may approach more and more closely with
ever increasing accuracy The contrast between Euclidean
geometry and Riemann geometry serves as an illustration.
Euclidean geometry emanates from postulates accepted as self
evident and leads to propositions supposed to be factually true
about physical space. Riemann geometry starts from another
set of postulates and leads to another description of space. If
we accept the hypothesis that an absolute interpretation of na-
ture is possible, we may ask which of these geometries is correct.
In reality the question has no meaning. The only question
that can be rationally asked is, which of these geometries is the
more helpful in the description and correlation of physical
phenomena. Euclidean geometry is and must remain the most
convenient but it is neither more nor less correct than Riemann
geometry. Even after Galileo and Newton had shown that
reasoning about physical phenomena must begin and end with
observation and experiment, the attempt to deduce physical
phenomena from fixed postulates persisted and it has required
the recent developments in the theory of relativity, in sub-
atomic physics and quantum mechanics to make us fully realize
the extent to which our thinking has been colored and made
invalid by fallacious underlying postulates for which there were
insufficient reasons in nature. Without a clear appreciation of
this fact the physical sciences would never have realized that
new physical propositions cannot be arrived at by any form of
syllogism without verification by observation and experiment
and that habit, custom, and tradition have played and are play-
ing a very important part in comparison with intelligence in the
accepted views of the universe.
This failure to press the physical universe into a precon-
ceived pattern designed for a definite purpose or emanating
from accepted postulates, has wide significance in other fields
of thought. In educational discussions we frequently set out
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from a set of postulates, proceed as if new truth can be deduced
from definitions or general laws from a study of phenomena
not originally included in the formulation of the law The
progress of the physical sciences very dearly suggests that any
attempt to formulate a preconceived scheme of education good
for a hundred years is doomed to complete failure. New forces
will be in operation, new situations must be met and new
adjustments made. We cannot get along with an educational
philosophy which emanates from the idea that a knowledge of
the past and an assimilation of the culture of the past are suffi-
cient. We must know vastly more than the fact that events
happened in the past in some kind of sequence, whether this is
a sequence in time or in space. Writing with a similar thought
in mind Professor Cook says that courts must not be content
to deduce conclusions from fixed principles or to derive a funda-
mental principle from the constitution and to apply it some new
form of legislation. They must be able to abstract a new rule
or modify an old rule, enrich new concepts or abandon old ones
so that social justice and economic well being may be conserved.
This newer and more scientific method is seen in a recent de-
cision handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States
in which it is affirmed that "The Constitution does not secure
to any one liberty to conduct his own business in such a fashion
as to inflict injury on the public at large or upon any substantial
group of the people. Neither property rights nor contracts
rights are absolute, for government cannot exist if the citizen
may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows or
exercise his freedom of contract to their harm."
After experiment and observation have supplied the neces-
sary data on which to build, the first essential of physical rea-
soning is to abstract from this data concepts which can be used
as invariants for the description of the phenomena under con-
sideration. One of the most important concepts thus abstracted
from nature is the concept of time. Primitive man must have
noticed that events did not occur simultaneously. He must
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have observed the rising and the setting sun and the changes of
the seasons and acquired some experience in noting longer or
shorter intervals of time. There thus developed through the
ages an experience which we call time. Newton thought of
time as an absolute entity but we only know of the stream of
time and we can only measure time intervals, that is, determine
whether one time interval is long or short as compared to a
fixed interval. In much the same way sense perceptions gave
us the concept of space. Newton thought of absolute space as
well as absolute time, but after all, we only know of space rela-
tions or the relation of objects to each other in space. Here
we have abstracted from nature two concepts - time and space.
Newton thought of them as absolute and independent. Einstein
shows that they are relative and dependent on each other.
This process of abstracting invariant concepts from complex
physical phenomena is a difficult undertaking. It begins by
removing from the observations all the qualities except the most
essential characteristics which are common to them all. In
dealing with gross matter the physicist finds the concept of
mass valuable. To arrive at this concept he strips from matter
its other characteristics, such as color, hardness, shape, or odor
and saves the one essential characteristic, the amount of matter
in the body The real difficulty in getting on in physics is the
difficulty of stripping from new facts or concepts a mass of
irrelevant details which at first seems indispensable and then
guessing which of the essential facts will furnish a key for
understanding physical phenomena.
To make somewhat more concrete this procedure, consider
two important physical concepts, particles whether atoms or
electrons and waves. Very early in the development of physical
science our sense perceptions gave us the concept of particles,
grains of sand or drops of water But as smaller and smaller
scale phenomena demanded interpretation, for example the
diffusion of gases or the law of multiple proportions, it was
necessary to reduce the size of the unit of matter to smaller and
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smaller dimensions, ending for sometime with the hypothetical
atoms of Dalton which were not only unobserved but unob-
servable. The properties to be assigned to these atoms were
those necessary to make them capable of correlating the physical
phenomena under consideration. Initially it was necessary to
suppose that they were small, hard, perfectly elastic spheres,
moving in absolute space and time and obeying laws which had
been found useful instruments of description for large scale
phenomena. These entities which we call atoms have no phys-
ical reality in excess of that attributed to them for the explicit
purpose of describing phenomena. When new and ampler data
were revealed by experiment, additional and unexpected prop-
erties were assigned to these atoms. They were found to be
made up of other particles, some charged with positive and some
with negative electricity Instead of being solid spheres they
had to be regarded as minature solar systems with central suns
and small negatively charged planets. The important point is
that whatever properties were assigned to these atoms and their
constituents were just those properties which made the atoms
effective instruments of description for the physical phenomena
under consideration.
Sense perceptions gave the physicist another concept which
has proved extremely valuable as a language in terms of which
to describe physical phenomena. Suppose you drop a pebble
into the surface of a pool of water. You find what the physicist
calls a system of waves going out from the center of this dis-
turbance. If you observe the characteristics of this disturbance
you find a certain set of properties which can be abstracted, for
example the wave length, the displacement, the frequency, and
the velocity These universal characteristics we call the char-
acteristics of wave motion and we find them useful symbols in
terms of which to describe a great variety of phenomena. In
the hands of Young and Fresnel they gave an interpretation of
the interference and diffraction of light. In the hands of Max-
well they offer a basis for an understanding of electromagnetic
waves and paved the way for wireless telegraphy and telephony
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But these two concepts did not prove uniquely supreme in
their original fields of usefulness. When it began to appear
that the phenomena of light could be successfully interpreted as
a wave motion new facts were discovered which could not be
interpreted in terms of wave motions, and it was necessary to
reintroduce into radiation phenomena ideas associated with
particles and to build up a supplementary description of radia-
tion phenomena in the language of particles. Similarly when
it appeared that the language of the particle theory was about
to prove adequate for a description of small scale phenomena
in the field of subatomic physics, it was discovered that it was
necessary to use the language of waves to describe some of the
characteristics of electrons and protons. This important turn in
physical methods very forcibly reminded the physicist of the
limitations of his method, emphasizing the fact that we are
dealing with concepts abstracted from gross phenomena and
then using these concepts for the description and correlation of
phenomena which may be beyond the range of sense percep-
tions. There is now no more reason for regarding an electron
as entirely a particle than there is for describing radiation en-
tirely in terms of waves. The result is that both the concept
of waves and the concept of particles are needed to describe
electrons and both the concept of particles and of waves are
needed to describe radiation.
These simpler and more concrete types of abstractions and
invariants which are immediately abstracted from physical
phenomena have proved inadequate to meet the full needs of
modern physics and it has been found necessary to supplement
them by hypothetical abstractions which are of necessity beyond
observation. The whole structure of modern physics is built
on this kind of abstractions. The spinning electron is a hypo-
thetical abstraction introduced to correlate certain spectroscopic
phenomena, but there is no thought that direct experiment will
verify or disprove its hypothetical spin. Such abstractions are
essentially conceptical in their nature without any properties
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which subject them to experimental laws. They can be en-
dowed with any characteristics which enable them to correlate
phenomena. They are neither observable nor real in the sense
that ordinary existences are observable or real. They are very
different from potential experiences. They are a kind of mental
edifice into which has been introduced any rational ideas which
are helpful in the correlation of physical phenomena. The sole
criterion is that they must accommodate experience and inter-
relate phenomena.
After fundamental entities or invariants have been ab-
stracted, they must be formulated into mathematical laws or
principles. In this way Newton formulated principles which
were inseparably wedded to the phenomena they described.
Whatever could not be deduced from the phenomena had no
place in his experimental philosophy Every observer before
Newton must have inquired about the conditions which deter-
mine the path of a flying arrow or a falling stone. It took the
genius of Newton to see the simple rule which unites and inter-
prets these phenomena. To get the rule he abstracted from
the phenomena certain unchanging entities in terms of which
the phenomena could be described and then put these entities
together in a simple mathematical formulation, thus abstracting
the rule from the phenomena themselves. Having abstracted
time and space as fundamental and apparently independent
entities, Newton set up an absolute frame of reference for phys-
ical phenomena which was consistent with all experience up to
Newton's time, but when high speeds with which Newton had
no occasion to deal were observed, it was necessary to abandon
the concepts of absolute time and space and replace them by a
new abstraction - the concept of time-space as a single entity,
remembering that the way in which they are to be united de-
pends on experiment. This procedure amounts to regarding
time as a fourth dimension with all the essential properties of
a distance. The result is as if we had formed an abstract me-
dium which has four dimensions, length, breadth, thickness, and
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time instead of two media -time with one dimension and
space with three dimensions. Now absolute time and space were
abstractions from observations. In just the same way time-
space is an abstraction from observation. The latter is to be
preferred over the former because it correlates a larger range
of observations and this is the sole test of its correctness or in-
correctness. Thus Einstein extends the method of Newton into
regions about which Newton could have no information, but
he did vastly more. He showed that an absolute frame of ref-
erence could have no meaning, that two persons can logically
differ as to the simultaneity of two events - one observing that
the events occur at the same time and the other observing with
equal confidence that these same events occur at different times.
We were thus forced to abandon those fundamental concepts of
both time and space which had become the very cornerstones
of our interpretation of nature. At the same time we aban-
doned our belief in any real meaning of absolute length in the
sense that one set of measures could be characterized as right
and another set as wrong. There are an infimte number that
may be considered right if suitable frames of references have
been chosen. With the abandonment of our ideas of absolute
time and space goes also the abandonment of our ideas of the
absolute in the physical universe. There may be an infimte
number of interpretations of nature depending on the frames
of reference to which the physical phenomena have 'been re-
ferred. The physicist tries to express the laws of nature so that
no matter what frame of reference the data are referred to, we
always get the same results. This means that the laws must be
invariant under any transformation from one system of coordi-
nates to another This is the severest test of correctness and
universality In each case the initial conditions must be specified
as well as the characteristics of the frames of reference. The
final picture may seem to be different to different observers but
the description of the facts may be accurate in each case. To
one observer the path of a planet may appear to be a circle i
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to another it may appear to be an ellipse. The question of
correctness or incorrectness is not raised. The accuracy and the
sufficiency of the description is all that we can insist upon. The
equations describing these physical phenomena may have differ-
ent forms according to the frame of reference to which they are
referred. The answer is the same but the form of expression
is different. Hence a physicist can tell from the form of the
equations whether Maxwell's equations are referred to fixed
or moving system of axes or to a Newtonian or an Einstein
frame of reference.
So Newtonian mechanics is extended by relativistic mechan-
ics and the concept of the absolute is replaced by the concept of
the relative. The point of view of Newton proves to be too nar-
row but besides clarifying most large scale phenomena it led to
the belief or faith that there is an order in nature, that Venus
will follow the same orbit whether or not we are observing her,
that the spectrum of hydrogen is the same on the sun as in the
laboratory Furthermore this new method established the right
of the human mind to deal directly with physical phenomena
without the acceptance of external authority. The authority of
tradition was replaced by the authority of experiment and
observation.
With these developments physicists ceased to be interested
in a possible world of reality which might lie behind the world
of sense perceptions. Such an abstraction perhaps necessary to
satisfy some modes of thought has not proved helpful in the
clarification of physical phenomena. On the other hand, the
physical world is not considered as something apart from the
physicist who studies it,-something to be explored from a dis-
tance, somewhat absolute both in time and space, something
which had been before man appeared and will be the same when
the last man disappears. This new attitude may be stated in an
abridged quotation from Jeans, "The ancient Hebrew, the ana-
logue of the nineteenth century physicist, saw the rainbow as an
objective structure set in the heavens for all men to behold the
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token of a covenant between God and man and as objective as
the signature on a check. We know that the objective rainbow
is an illusion. Raindrops break the sunlight up into rays of
many colors and the colored rays which enter any man's eyes
from the rainbow form the rainbow he sees but the rainbow
which enters one man's eyes can never enter those of a second
man. No two men can see the same rainbow. Each man's rain-
bow is a selection of his own eyes, a subjective selection from an
objective reality which is not a rainbow at all." It is much the
same in all physical phenomena. We are less concerned with
the absolute and more with the relative. We have learned that
all we can ever hope to know is the relation of physical phenom-
ena to each other. We have also learned to be liberal minded,
to consider all sides of a question, to suspend judgments and
be prepared for a reversal of opinions with the introduction of
new experimental evidence. There are no necessary laws. One
pattern or design is not to be preferred over another, except as
one is more inclusive or more precise than the other. We
realize now that we are viewing the world through human
spectacles and that we must recognize the distortion which they
may introduce. Much of the simplicity, intimacy and certainty
of our earlier explanations were introduced by our way of look-
ing at phenomena and are not really inherent in nature itself.
We further realize that man is a creature in the process of mak-
ing himself and that he must not tie himself down to what he
knows and ignore what he does not know His divinations and
guesses may be more important than his certainties. He must
direct his attention to dealing with phenomena in terms of con-
cepts abstracted from the phenomena themselves and he must
be willing to refer these phenomena to any frame of reference
which has the essential characteristics of convenience and sim-
plicity
"The world of physics is then," as Planck says, "a deliber-
ate hypothesis put forth by a finite mind in an attempt to reduce
the facts of observation to a system based on certain physical
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principles such that known phenomena are necessary conse-
quences of the system." The basic principles are chosen on ex-
perimental grounds. Whether they are true or false in the
absolute sense is not a pertinent question. Their consequences
must agree with nature. They are working hypotheses which
are to be discarded whenever they cease to be effective or help-
ful. Progress means bringing new sets of observations with the
system in a way to give a complete mathematical description of
physical phenomena in terms of the fewest principles or entities,
that is to find in a variety of physical phenomena essential rela-
tions from which future phenomena can be predicted. Physics
is thus a result of our quest for order and harmony among phys-
ical phenomena. It is man's best attempt to think vigorously
whatever permits of vigorous thinking. It is not fixed but is
subject to change and evolution. Whatever comes out must go
back to enrich the soil from which it came.
The successes which have followed this approach to nature
and the possibilities which lie ahead are evident. Never before
has our intellectual horizon been so extended as it has since
these modes of thought began to be applied. In the direction
of large scale phenomena we have arrived at almost limitless
space populated by spiral nebulae, more or less uniformly dis-
tributed, through a sphere which is a million or more light
years in radius. In the direction of small scale phenomena, we
have determined the essential constituents of the atom and
their arrangement with respect to each other and are now
addressing ourselves to the more difficult problem of the nu-
cleus, with increasing evidence of success. An unlimited number
of problems still lie between these extremes, awaiting an attack
by an extension of these methods. The possibilities are limited
only by the imagination, experimental skill and intellectual
ingenuity of man. Just as the Copernican theory assigned a
different place to man in the universe, so also modern physics
and astronomy are producing immense changes in man's out-
look on the universe, revealing to him new types of thinking
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and adding new meaning to human life. The development of
quantum mechanics has given a knowledge of the internal char-
acteristics of the atom which is nearly as complete and self con-
sistent as our knowledge of celestial mechanics. This develop-
ment was only possible after the introduction of a new and
strange form of physical analysis which gave a new meaning to
physical explanation. The sublime order which is thus emerg-
ing from the former chaos, must be somewhat inherent in the
world of sense perceptions. It can not be merely the working of
man's mind.
Now this process of abstracting significant and universal
characteristics from phenomena is not peculiar to the physical
sciences but in them it has found its most perfect development.
The biologists have abstracted such concepts as cells and genes
and used them for the explanation of living organisms. Artists
and musicians must avail themselves of this method of proced-
ure and a great poet must have caught something from the situ-
ation which is to be universal and invariant through the ages.
The economists are concerned with purchasing power but this
is only an attempt to find a concept which is universal in its
characteristics without asking what particular goods or services
are involved. In psychology consciousness is an abstraction
from mental behavior just as time and space are abstractions
from sense perceptions. Justice is an abstraction from social
relations for the description of social phenomena and one does
not undertake to express it in terms of physical abstractions.
Social and economic laws just as physical laws must rest on
direct observation and on a study of the actual structure and
function of our modern social and economic life. They must
correlate facts which actually exist-not those which are espe-
cially desired or fancied by some prejudiced observer. These
laws must be expressed in terms of social concepts abstracted
from the phenomena themselves. What the social scientist
wants is not descriptions in terms of nebulous and ill-defined
ideas. The political theorist can not get on with abstractions
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like the people, sovereignty, electorate, liberty, public welfare
without a clarification of these concepts. He must know how
human beings inter-act and these inter-actions must be described
in terms of social, economic, and political abstractions, not in
terms of physical or biological abstractions. Nor will it be
enough to apply pre-existing concepts and terms to which fixed
meanings have become attached. The excessive use of the
indivisible atom speaks strongly against such a procedure. With
each new advance in the theory of matter, this atom has been
remoulded and enriched with new and important properties.
In like manner it will be necessary for the social scientist to
enrich his terms and concepts, to make them describe new rela-
tions and satisfy the ends for which they were created.
In dealing with social and economic data it will be found
necessary to parallel another recent development in physics.
The essence of this development is the attempt to discard from
physics any material which is purely speculative and leads to
conclusions which cannot be tested by experiment. The pre-
diction of every physical theory must be capable of proof or
disproof by an appeal to observation. This condition requires
that every theory or explanation must rest primarily on observ-
able entities. If the human mind is to find a way to think itself
out of its social and economic difficulties it must more and more
follow this example of the physical sciences and formulate its
laws in terms of verifiable relations. When we have the same
kind of analytical study of the social sciences that we have of
the physical sciences we will find less indifference to the lessons
they teach. Whatever indifference man has had to the past as
a teacher he has been duly respectful of the message expressed
in the chemical forces released in high explosives or the elec-
trical forces manifested in lightning. If the conclusions of his-
tory were equally certain we might not need to consider the
quotation attributed to Hegel. "We learn from history," said
Hegel, "that we learn nothing from history" Such a statement
means that we have not learned to abstract from social phe-
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nomena concepts in terms of which social phenomena can be
described with certainty and future social phenomena predicted.
The progress of the physical sciences teaches us dearly that
if we are to avoid a muddled state of mind we must recognize
that we are not living in a fixed environment and that our habits
of thought must continually adjust themselves to a changing
world controlled largely by advances in scientific technology
At the present rate of advance a given individual will be called
upon to face more and more situations which have little parallel
with the past. This is no world for a man of fixed ideas either
in the physical or the social sciences. The abstractions which
were valid as effective means of description of either social or
physical phenomena must be changed. Absolute time and abso-
lute space had to be replaced by relative time and space. Lib-
erty and equality were originally concepts abstracted by Locke
and Rousseau from a social order characterized by small peas-
ants and proprietor. When we try to apply these abstractions
to an industrial order they cannot be made to fit without
modification.
As modern physics gave up absolute time and space and
replaced Newtonian mechanics by relativistic mechanics, we
must be prepared to hear less of absolute justice enthroned on
high and the eternal and inalienable rights of man. Justice is
an abstraction from social phenomena and there is nothing
absolute about it. We can only have relative justice which is
an abstraction from social phenomena to describe a social world
out of social equilibrium and trying to regain it. It is more
like saying the entropy of the system is a maximum. When
social equilibrium has been reached, social justice or the social
entropy of the system is a maximum.
Human rights are neither eternal nor inalienable. Just as
the law of gravitation is a relation abstracted from physical
phenomena so these eternal and inalienable rights are relations
abstracted from social phenomena to describe conditions which
should obtain in the normal state. The eternal and inalienable
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rights of man are no more than a description of the relations of
man to man in a changing world. Any attempt to formulate
them as a permanent framework must fail just as the attempt
to force thinking about the physical world into the Aristotelian
pattern failed. The most we can do is to discover the rules
according to which social groups function and order our be-
havior accordingly If the phrase in the Constitution "to pro-
mote the general welfare and insure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity" is reared against the background
of the present social order as we would reread the law of gravi-
tation in light of our present physical knowledge, we wonder
whether we are as ready to accept its new implications as we
are ready to accept the new implications of the law of gravita-
tion. When the law of gravitation requires that we admit a new
planet like Neptune or Pluto into the solar system it is done
not only without hesitation but with a good deal of satisfaction,
but when we have passed from an agricultural to an industrial
order and find that an attempt to insure domestic tranquillity or
promote the general welfare requires that the government
insure a reasonable opportunity for every man to work at a
minimum wage, we think we are on the eve of a revolution in
social thinking. We tardily recognize the ability of our fore-
fathers to make universal and penetrating generalizations which
are valid for all time. If Lincoln can say with general approval
"A nation cannot long survive half slave and half free," we
might admit that the framers of the Constitution could see that
a nation could not long survive half employed and half unem-
ployed.
Now modern theoretical physics dearly teaches that phys-
ical theory of itself has little power. It becomes powerful only
when it is integrated into some system of data experimentally
deterrrned, some system of engineering needs or human wants.
It is then and only then it begins to really function. If it is
conceived as something complete within itself, it is essentially
a brilliant but futile intellectual adventure. If there were a
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divorce between theory and practice in the physical science,
progress would be an impossibility This only means, as Dewey
points out, that intelligence in itself has nopower. It is intelli-
gence integrated into some form of human needs and demands
that makes it effective. It has been one of the major errors of
much of our social, cultural, and educational thinking that we
have thought of education, intelligence, and culture as set apart
from action as entities existing in a vacuum, as reserves against
the day of decisive action. We know nothing of such segrega-
tion and such differentiation between theory and practice. We
do not call one subject cultural and the other non-cultural any
more than we would differentiate between one part of the body,
the heart and the brain. It is much safer to keep them together
and functioning as part of a unity. If the relation of the phys-
ical sciences to the engineering sciences is to teach any thing to
the social sciences at this point, it must be this, using the words
of Dewey. "There must be a change in the prevailing concep-
tion of social knowledge and an abandonment of the idea that
knowledge comes first and action later. They must be inti-
mately associated both in the process of acquiring them and in
the process of making them function. The crucial problem is
how intelligence may gain necessary power through incorpora-
tion with wants and interests that we are already operating."
That is precisely how physical knowledge and engineering ap-
plications have acquired their power and this is the only method
by which traditionalism based on self-interest can be eliminated
from our social and economic life.
It is our opinion that the thinking characteristic of modern
physics gives a firm foundation on which to base our outlook on
nature and that its methods have much of meaning in them for
the less exact fields of knowledge. If the biological and social
sciences can be as successful in interpreting and correlating
human experiences and behavior as the physical sciences have
been in interpreting physical phenomena we may yet build an
intellectual habitation which takes account of the fact that we
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are human beings living in a physical world. According to the
physicists here "lies the path of advance to a clear purposed
goal but it leads up a long steep journey." Its appeal lies in
its certainty, and its challenge to the best collective and cooper-
ative thinking which can be achieved through the progressive
development of the human mind.
